Reports

Department of Education OIG

The Department’s Use of Pandemic Assistance Program Administration Funds

The objective of our review was to determine the Department’s progress on spending program administration funds authorized by coronavirus response and relief laws, including how those funds have been used to date, and the Department’s plans for using remaining funds.We found that the Department has allocated nearly 100 percent2 of its pandemic assistance program administration funds and that the Department is on track to obligate all of its program administration funds prior to the dates the funds are set to expire. The Department allocated the funds to 11 principal offices and as of February...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Small Business Administration OIG

COVID-19 and Disaster Assistance Information Systems Security Controls

This report presents the results of our audit to determine whether the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) maintained effective management control activities and monitoring of the design and implementation of third-party operated SBA systems. SBA needed information technology systems from third-party service providers that could improve the system efficiency and productivity to process high transaction volumes, transmit data between other information systems, and safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the personally identifiable information processed by the programs.We found the...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/27/2022

1 - Open

Ensure the existing SBA System Development Methodology is updated to include supply chain risk-management practices as required by OMB Circular A-130 and high-value asset system designation guidance. Also, ensure high-value asset system risks are incorporated into the enterprise risk management framework, as recommended by OMB M-19-03 and SBA SOP 90 47 6.

10 - Open

Implement an automated process to document and monitor system changes as recommended by NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.

2 - Open

Communicate and enforce the SBA System Development Methodology in which a traceability matrix is used to ensure that system requirements can be tested and demonstrated in the operational system. Ensure all requirements are aligned with the contractual acceptance criteria.

3 - Open

Implement in updated agency guidance, the requirements of OMB Circular No. A-123 that stipulate a SOC 1 Type 2 report is needed for all new and existing financial systems. This guidance should also require confirmation at least annually that the controls are functioning as designed.

4 - Closed

Enforce the requirement to establish and implement internal controls to ensure appropriate program officials perform and document contract reviews to ensure that information security is appropriately addressed in the contracting language, as required by OMB Circular A-130 and SBA SOP 90 47 6.

5 - Open

In conjunction with the Enterprise Risk Management Board, implement enterprise-wide privacy risk mitigation practices that can be assimilated into new and existing system program designs.

6 - Open

Complete an initial assessment and authorization for each information system and all agency-designated common controls before operation.

7 - Open

Transition information systems and common controls to an ongoing authorization process (when eligible for such a process) with the formal approval of the respective authorizing officials or reauthorize information systems and common controls as needed, on a time or event-driven basis in accordance with agency risk tolerance, as required by OMB Circular No. A-130 and SOP 90 47 6.

8 - Open

Review and update POA&Ms at least quarterly as required by SOP 90 47 6.

9 - Closed

Ensure data-sharing agreements are reviewed annually as required by SBA SOP 90 47 6.

Department of Education OIG

Allocation of ESSER I Funds at Selected Local Educational Agencies

The objective of our review is to describe how selected local educational agencies (LEA) allocated Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) funds provided under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).As of March 2022, the 46 LEAs spent over $19.2 million, or about 95 percent, of the $20.2 million in ESSER I funds that they were awarded. The majority of these ESSER I funds were spent on district-wide programs, and about 26 percent of ESSER I funds were allocated to specific schools, with the majority of that portion allocated to Title I schools over...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Election Assistance Commission OIG

Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

EAC OIG, through the independent public accounting firm of McBride, Lock & Associates, LLC, audited funds received by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Help America Vote Act, including state matching funds and interest earned, totaling $53.4 million. This included Election Security, reissued Section 251, and Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act grants.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/22/2022

Department of Homeland Security OIG

FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls that may have prevented the 21 state workforce agencies (SWA) in our review from distributing more than $3.7 billion in improper payments through its Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/22/2022

1 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a standard risk assessment process before initiating new Federal grant programs. This risk assessment should focus on identifying and evaluating program risks that may affect FEMA’s ability to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in its programs and mitigating those external risks to the extent practical.

2 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator, when mandated to rely on eligibility determinations of non-FEMA programs, develop a process to assess the program controls and identify risk to the extent practical.

3 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator update the State Administrative Plan template to incorporate a requirement for grantees to include a description of the steps to prevent improper payments.

4 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to monitor whether grantees implement and use the controls attested in FEMA-approved State Administrative Plans.

5 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator work with state workforce agencies to evaluate the Lost Wages Assistance program payments and verify that all recipients who received payment have a self-certification on file, as required; to determine whether the claimant meets eligibility requirements if no self-certification is on file; and, if not, to recover the payment.

6 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator conduct an after-action study of the Lost Wages Assistance program and update FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program based on the lessons learned from the study.

7 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator de-obligate and recover any monies determined to have been obtained fraudulently or other improper payments through Lost Wages Assistance from the state workforce agencies.

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/21/2022

1 - Closed

As detailed previously, we provided the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, with notifications and files detailing erroneous payments we identified and recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why the payments were made to prevent additional periodic payments to ineligible taxpayers. In addition, we recommended that the IRS add a stop payment transaction code to taxpayer accounts to prevent them from receiving additional improper advance Child Tax Credit payments.

2 - Closed

On August 9, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns related to eligible taxpayers who did not receive their advance Child Tax Credit payments. We recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why periodic payments were not made to eligible taxpayers.

3 - Closed

On June 29, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that the messaging provided on the IRS’s eligibility assistant tool and the presentation of information related to the advance Child Tax Credit payments on IRS.gov may be confusing to taxpayers. For example, the link to “Get Answers on the Advance Child Tax Credit” that is located on the IRS.gov main page takes taxpayers to the Advance Child Tax Credit Payments in 2021 web page; however, the links to get the questions and answers is at the bottom of the screen. We recommended that the IRS consider revising the messaging and presentation of information on its platforms to make it clear for taxpayers.

4 - Closed

On January 28, 2022, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that we identified 2.2 million taxpayers who had their direct deposit information updated by the IRS between August 23 and October 5, 2021. We recommended that the IRS conduct an outreach effort to inform taxpayers of the possibility that their advance payments may have been sent to payroll allotment accounts. This outreach effort could include sending a separate letter to the impacted taxpayers.

5 - Closed

The Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, should develop and implement processes and procedures to include data validation on incoming files from third-party sources prior to their use.

Department of Labor OIG

Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Other | 9/21/2022

Election Assistance Commission OIG

Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded to the State of Delaware

EAC OIG, through the independent public accounting firm of McBride, Lock & Associates, LLC, audited funds received by the State of Delaware under the Help America Vote Act, including state matching funds and interest earned, totaling $20 million. This included Election Security and Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act grants.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/21/2022

1 - Closed

We recommend that the EAC require the Office to transfer to the election fund $629,248 for the unsupported costs cited above.

2 - Closed

We recommend that the EAC require the Office to implement policies and procedures or training to ensure adequate documentation is maintained to support the allowability of expenditures charged to the HAVA grant, including maintaining copies of invoices paid, contracts from which purchases were made and purchase orders for purchases exceeding $10,000.

3 - Closed

We recommend the EAC require the Office to provide the inventory listing maintained by the IT Department and each County.

4 - Closed

We recommend the EAC require the Office to implement policies and procedures or training to ensure that assets are managed in accordance Uniform Guidance and the State of Delaware’s policy.

5 - Closed

We recommend the EAC require the Office to ensure that documented policies and procedures related to internal controls and asset management are established and implemented in accordance with the State of Delaware’s policy. Implementation should include policies to review and update the procedures on a regular basis.

6 - Closed

We recommend that the EAC require the Office to provide transaction detail of interest income earned for the Election Security and CARES Act grants.

7 - Closed

We recommend that the EAC require the Office to complete and file FFRs for the Section 251 funds or if the Office is unable to complete the Section 251 FFR, obtain financial services to support the completion of the filings.

8 - Closed

We recommend that the EAC require the Office to implement procedures and training to properly fill out the required FFRs, which reflect the uses of award funds and the interest income generated from those funds for all HAVA grants.

Department of Justice OIG

Audit of the Management and Coordination of Pandemic-Related Fraud Allegations and Referrals Between the Criminal Division and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

To view a message from the Inspector General, click here: https://oig.justice.gov/news/multimedia/video/message-inspector-general…

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Date Range

Report Type

Report Category

Submitting Agency

State (State and Local Reports)

Fraud Type

Agency Reviewed

Related Organizations

Management Challenges

Any Recommendations

Any Open Recommendations

Reports

The Department’s Use of Pandemic Assistance Program Administration Funds

COVID-19 and Disaster Assistance Information Systems Security Controls

Allocation of ESSER I Funds at Selected Local Educational Agencies

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion

Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded to the State of Delaware

Audit of the Management and Coordination of Pandemic-Related Fraud Allegations and Referrals Between the Criminal Division and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

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