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By Fraud Type
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Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During the 2021 Filing Season
On June 15, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns with the systemic calculation of the allowable RRC amount. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child for which the IRS has already paid an EIP or an RRC to someone else and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 7,022 individuals identified in which the IRS issued multiple RRCs for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 75,594 tax returns identified in which the individual is potentially a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Perform analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional tax returns with the same characteristics as those the IRS determined were filed by a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover erroneous RRC payments.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should coordinate with the Territories to confirm and recover erroneous RRCs.
Review the nearly 6.9 million potentially eligible individuals we provided to the IRS who had not filed a Tax Year 2020 tax return as of May 27, 2021, and send a letter to those individuals who still have not filed a Tax Year 2020 return to encourage them to file a return and claim the RRC if eligible.
Review the 3.1 million eligible individuals we identified who filed a Tax Year 2020 return and proactively issue these taxpayers their credit.
Conduct additional analysis to identify tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, in which an individual is eligible for the RRC based on their Tax Year 2020 tax return and did not claim the credit, and proactively issue the taxpayer their credit.
If IRS management does not proactively issue the RRC to individuals who filed a return and did not claim the credit, the IRS should notify these individuals that they are eligible to claim the RRC and should file an amended tax return to claim the credit.
On March 19, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that an incorrect amount of advance payments was being used to calculate the RRC for some taxpayers. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.
Work with the BFS to ensure that individuals who were denied the RRC and have still not activated their EIP1 or EIP2 debit card as of December 31, 2021, have EIPs reversed in their tax account and are issued their RRC. These processes should include notifying Metabank that the debit cards in question are to be cancelled.
Work with the BFS to obtain recurring data during Processing Year 2022 to identify individuals who have not activated their advance ARPA RRC debit card at the time a return is filed and implement processes to reverse the advance payment so these individuals can receive the RRC on their Tax Year 2021 tax return.
We alerted the Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns that the IRS was unnecessarily burdening taxpayers whose RRC claims were identified for manual ERS review. We recommended the IRS develop processes to systemically adjust RRC claims using the computer-generated RRC calculation.
On April 6, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns regarding ERS tax examiners incorrectly computing the RRC (see management’s action in response to Recommendation 1). We recommended the IRS review the returns we identified and take the actions necessary to ensure that these taxpayers receive the amount of the RRC they are entitled to receive.
On March 12, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that some tax returns were not being identified by fraud filters. We recommended IRS management review the returns we identified and associated fraud filters to identify why these returns were not selected and make programming changes as necessary to ensure proper identification of returns with potentially questionable claims.
Conduct analysis to identify Tax Year 2020 RRC claims processed after May 27, 2021, to identify other returns in which ERS tax examiners incorrectly calculated the number of allowable dependents and returns that were not reprocessed per IRS guidance after programming was corrected, and ensure that these taxpayers receive the correct amount of the RRC.
Review the 14,508 individuals identified in which the IRS issued an RRC to an individual who was claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC and were also claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box, and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 238,680 individuals under the age of 25 identified as potential dependents and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 15,741 individuals identified in which the individual incorrectly received an RRC and an EIP for the same qualifying child and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s Validation Memo – Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
North Redington Shores Man Indicted In Multiple Fraud Schemes
COVID Relief Fraudsters Sentenced To Prison
Spokane Resident Pleads Guilty to Fraudulently Obtaining More Than $50,000 in COVID-19 Relief Funds
Two Defendants Sentenced in Unemployment Fraud Scheme
State Employee Charged in Over $1 million Unemployment Fraud Scheme
The Child Tax Credit Update Portal Was Successfully Deployed, but Security and Process Improvements Are Needed
Ensure that the ELC coaches comply with existing agency requirements related to the independent verification and validation of all ELC artifacts.
Ensure that the ELC coaches comply with existing agency requirements related to the independent verification and validation of all ELC artifacts.
Ensure that the ELC coaches comply with existing agency requirements related to the independent verification and validation of all ELC artifacts.
Prioritize remediation efforts on the two noncompliant SADI system servers that have weighted noncompliance scores of less than 90 percent.
Prioritize remediation efforts on the two noncompliant SADI system servers that have weighted noncompliance scores of less than 90 percent.
Prioritize remediation efforts on the two noncompliant SADI system servers that have weighted noncompliance scores of less than 90 percent.
Ensure that only authorized approving authorities provide status updates and grant final approval of ELC artifacts during required milestone reviews.
Ensure that only authorized approving authorities provide status updates and grant final approval of ELC artifacts during required milestone reviews.
Ensure that only authorized approving authorities provide status updates and grant final approval of ELC artifacts during required milestone reviews.
Establish a formal process, which includes routine updates, to identify primary and proxy approvers for all ELC artifacts.
Establish a formal process, which includes routine updates, to identify primary and proxy approvers for all ELC artifacts.
Establish a formal process, which includes routine updates, to identify primary and proxy approvers for all ELC artifacts.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that systems supported by the CSPs have an approved IRS ATO prior to a system’s deployment.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that systems supported by the CSPs have an approved IRS ATO prior to a system’s deployment.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that systems supported by the CSPs have an approved IRS ATO prior to a system’s deployment.
The Chief Privacy Officer should establish a process that complies with Office of Management and Budget requirements regarding the selection, implementation, assessment, and continuous monitoring of privacy controls.
The Chief Privacy Officer should ensure that formal documentation is created that shows that all the privacy controls applicable to the SADI system are properly selected, implemented, and assessed.
The Chief Privacy Officer should ensure that formal documentation is created that shows that all the privacy controls applicable to the SADI system are properly selected, implemented, and assessed.
The Chief Privacy Officer should ensure that formal documentation is created that shows that all the privacy controls applicable to the SADI system are properly selected, implemented, and assessed.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the Cybersecurity function validates that all required NIST physical and environmental protection and media protection controls are implemented.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the Cybersecurity function validates that all required NIST physical and environmental protection and media protection controls are implemented.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the Cybersecurity function validates that all required NIST physical and environmental protection and media protection controls are implemented.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the IRS prioritizes completing the processes that will validate newly built servers being placed into the production environment meet minimum compliance requirements and initiate vulnerability scanning and remediation during the server build process.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the IRS prioritizes completing the processes that will validate newly built servers being placed into the production environment meet minimum compliance requirements and initiate vulnerability scanning and remediation during the server build process.
The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the IRS prioritizes completing the processes that will validate newly built servers being placed into the production environment meet minimum compliance requirements and initiate vulnerability scanning and remediation during the server build process.
Ensure that all CTC Update Portal and SADI system associated POA&Ms (listed in Appendix II) are completed timely based on IRS-defined timelines and processes.